Princeton Office
Saturday, May 19, 2:10 pm
Driving on the Revoked List because of Unpaid Insurance Surcharges? Jail and $3,000 additional surcharge!
A significant amount of New Jersey drivers end up on the revoked list (suspended driver’s license) because they cannot pay their insurance surcharge to the Motor Vehicle Commission. In New Jersey, driving is mandatory if you want to work, eat or have contact with the rest of the state. Inevitably, these drivers are going to get caught. The penalties for a conviction for Driving on the Revoked List included a fine, loss of license and depending on prior convictions jail. The hidden cost for pleading guilty for driving on the revoked list because of a failure to pay insurance surcharges is an additional $3,000 surcharge from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. The Court will not tell you because the Court does not assess the surcharge, the MVC does.
An attorney can help get you on a payment plan with MVC and get your license reinstated. once reinstated, the Driving on the Revoked List charge can be amended to another charge that does not have a loss of license, jail and. $3,000 insurance surcharge. If you think not hiring an attorney will save you money, think again.
But Officer, the light was yellow!
We have all had that experience of approaching an intersection just to see the light turn yellow. We speed up and try to get through the intersection before it turns red. No harm, no foul, right? Wrong. In New Jersey you must stop at a yellow light unless you are within 50 feet of the intersection. You read it right. You must stop on a yellow light. Today many people rely on “common law,” which is not the body of case law relied on by attorneys but the public misconception of what the law is. Some of this understanding is an innocent attempt to make common sence and law consistent but law and common sence rarely belong in the same sentence.
So, what to do? If you are approaching an intersection and the light turns yellow, check your rear view mirror. Make sure no one is following so closely that you will be in an accident if you stop. Remember, there is always the defense of “Emergency.” You can argue that if you stopped it would have caused an accident, thus it constituted an emergency justifying going through the yellow light. Oh, also remember, the police officer will always testify that you went through a red light no matter what the color of the light.
If you can, stop at the yellow light. You make get some menacing stares by other drivers but you will avoid a traffic ticket and even a potential accident with a driver trying to get a jump on his light. As always, if you have any questions about this post or any legal issue, please call me. The advice is free!
Do New Jersey Police Officers Suppress Exculpatory Evidence in DWI Arrests?
After reviewing dozens of “in-car” videos depicting roadside stops and investigations, it is clear that police systematically suppress exculpatory evidence. How do the do it. The police have the ability to point and focus the “in-car” camera after they stop a vehicle. For their own protection, they always zoom in on the license plate and then point the camera toward the driver side door of the vehicle. When a police officer suspects the driver of being intoxicated, he/she must perform a series of field sobriety test on the driver to determine whether there is probable cause to arrest the driver. Time and time again, the police officer makes the driver perform the field sobriety tests outside of the view of the “in-car” camera. This way the driver cannot use the video to establish that he/she was sober at the time of the arrest. The Court will only have the police officer’s subjective opinions when determining guilt.
Most of the time, police officers testify that they have to make the driver perform the test away from the view of the camera because they do not want to jeopardize the safety of the driver. Usually the camera show the area in between the front of the police car and the back of the driver’s car. Officer’s consistently testify that making the driver perform the field sobriety test in this area would jeopardize everyone’s safety in the event that there was an accident. But this fails to explain why police chose to use the driver’s vehicle to block the video with the driver’s car even when safety is not an issue. There are times when a driver is stopped in a parking lot or off road. This is a perfect opportunity for a police officer to point the camera at the area where the driver is performing the field sobriety tests. time and time again, they refuse to do so. The police make the driver do the test outside of the camera view. They suppress exculpatory evidence. While police argue that driver’s violate the drinking and driving laws, it is the police that disregard the United States Constitution and the due process protections it gives to citizens.
Despite the obvious disregard for the rights of the driver, New Jersey Municipal Court Judges allow the police to violate driver’s rights day in and day out. Rarely will a municipal court judge recognize that police are suppressing exculpatory evidence. They deny defendant’s applications for dismissal even where the police blatantly hide exculpatory evidence. What to do? You have to be in the case for the long haul. It seems that Judges’ respect for the Constitution increases at each level in the process. Also, judges hate to be overturned or critiqued for their lack of attention to the law by the Court above. I suggest that you retain a lawyer that is not only willing to try your case but take it up on appeal! If you have a question about your case, please feel free to call me.
Can your criminal records be expunged? Yes they can!
A criminal record can have a devastating impact on one’s ability to get a job. Sometimes it is unfair to punish people for mistakes that they made while they were young. New Jersey law recognizes this fact and has a procedure to expunge a person’s record.
New Jersey Expungement Statutes
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2. Indictable Offenses.
a.In all cases, except as herein provided, wherein a person has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this State and who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, and has not been adjudged a disorderly person or petty disorderly person on more than two occasions may, after the expiration of a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition as provided in section 2C:52-7 to the Superior Court in the county in which the conviction was entered praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a petition may be filed and presented, and the court may grant an expungement pursuant to this section, although less than 10 years has expired in accordance with the requirements of the preceding paragraph where the court finds: (1)less than 10 years has expired from the satisfaction of a fine, but the 10-year time requirement is otherwise satisfied, and the court finds that the person substantially complied with any payment plan ordered pursuant to N.J.S.2C:46-1 et seq., or could not do so due to compelling circumstances affecting his ability to satisfy the fine; or (2)at least five years has expired from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later; the person has not been convicted of a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense since the time of the conviction; and the court finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant’s character and conduct since conviction. In determining whether compelling circumstances exist for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a court may consider the amount of the fine or fines imposed, the person’s age at the time of the offense, the person’s financial condition and other relevant circumstances regarding the person’s ability to pay. Although subsequent convictions for no more than two disorderly or petty disorderly offenses shall not be an absolute bar to relief, the nature of those conviction or convictions and the circumstances surrounding them shall be considered by the court and may be a basis for denial of relief if they or either of them constitute a continuation of the type of unlawful activity embodied in the criminal conviction for which expungement is sought.
b.Records of conviction pursuant to statutes repealed by this Code for the crimes of murder, manslaughter, treason, anarchy, kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, arson, perjury, false swearing, robbery, embracery, or a conspiracy or any attempt
to commit any of the foregoing, or aiding, assisting or concealing persons accused of the foregoing crimes, shall not be expunged. Records of conviction for the following crimes specified in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice shall not be subject to expungement: Section 2C:11-1 et seq. (Criminal Homicide), except death by auto as specified in section 2C:11-5; section 2C:13-1 (Kidnapping); section 2C:13-6 (Luring or Enticing); section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8) (Human Trafficking); section 2C:14-2 (Aggravated Sexual Assault); section 2C:14-3a (Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor, section 2C:14-3b (Criminal Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim, section 2C:13-2 (Criminal Restraint) or section 2C:13-3 (False Imprisonment); section 2C:15-1 (Robbery); section 2C:17-1 (Arson and Related Offenses); section 2C:24-4a. (Endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child); section 2C:24-4b(4) (Endangering the welfare of a child); section 2C:24-4b. (3) (Causing or permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act); section 2C:24-4b.(5)(a) (Selling or manufacturing child pornography); section 2C:28-1 (Perjury); section 2C:28-2 (False Swearing); section 2C:34-1b.(4) (Knowingly promoting the prostitution of the actor’s child); section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2) (Terrorism); subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-3) (Producing or Possessing Chemical Weapons, Biological Agents or Nuclear or Radiological Devices); and conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes. Records of conviction for any crime committed by a person holding any public office, position or employment, elective or appointive, under the government of this State or any agency or political subdivision thereof and any conspiracy or attempt to commit such a crime shall not be subject to expungement if the crime involved or touched such office, position or employment. c.In the case of conviction for the sale or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance or possession thereof with intent to sell, expungement shall be denied except where the crimes involve: (1)Marijuana, where the total quantity sold, distributed or possessed with intent to sell was 25 grams or less; (2)Hashish, where the total quantity sold, distributed or possessed with intent to sell was five grams or less; or (3)Any controlled dangerous substance provided that the conviction is of the third or fourth degree, where the court finds that expungement is consistent with the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense and the petitioner’s character and conduct since conviction. d.In the case of a State licensed physician or podiatrist convicted of an offense involving drugs or alcohol or pursuant to section 14 or 15 of P.L.1989, c.300 (C.2C:21-20 or 2C:21-4.1), the court shall notify the State Board of Medical Examiners upon receipt of a petition for expungement of the conviction and records and information pertaining thereto.
Amended 1989, c.300, s.23; 1993, c.301; 1994, c.133, s.6; 2009, c.188, s.1.
DWI CONVICTION ENTERED IN FACE OF REASONABLE DOUBT IS REVERSED
The New Jersey Law Journal reports:
“An Essex County judge who shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in a drunken-driving case and convicted her despite finding reasonable doubt was reversed Thursday in State v. Driscoll, A-5842-08. After hearing testimony from Patricia Driscoll’s treating neurologist — who said her erratic driving on the night of her arrest was the result of Lyme disease, fatigue and a condition called presyncope, which causes dizziness, disorientation, loss of balance and mild cognitive dysfunction — Superior Court Judge Robert Gardner held “the defendant cannot sustain the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defense offered.” The Appellate Division rejected the state’s request for a limited remand on the theory that Gardner merely spoke imprecisely. “If we remand to the fact-finder for clarification, we would be inviting the court to make a finding inconsistent with its stated finding of reasonable doubt,” the court said.”
It is the State, NOT the defendant that has the burden of proving each element of the offense of driving while intoxicated, beyond a reasonable doubt. While some municipal courts try to shift burdens on to the defendant, it is improper. Interestingly in this case, the Superior Court Judge did not remand the issue back to the municipal court for a finding consistent with the law. Obviously, the municipal court judge would have changed the language in his holding to say that the State proved the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Superior Court Judge recognize this and did not give him the chance to do so.
If a driver is in an accident and there are no witnesses, was the driver careless?
Municipal courts routinely hold someone guilty of careless driving when there is an accident. The Prosecutor rarely has a witness that can testify about what the driver did that was careless. They cannot make the defendant testify because the defendant has a 5th Amendment right to not testify. Most police officers are not accident re-constructionist. Lawyers will have their client take a plea rather than try the case. Well, the case law says that the State needs more than the fact that an accident happened.
In State v. Wenzel, the Appellate Division said the municipal court cannot shift the burden of proof onto the defendant to prove his or her innocence.
Prosecution for a motor vehicle violation is a quasi-criminal proceeding and the State has the burden of establishing all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cestone, 38 N.J. Super. 139, 147-148 (App. Div. 1955); State v. Ring, 85 N.J. Super. 341, 343 (App. Div. 1964), certif. den. 44 N.J. 407 (1965). Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the State — see State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-459 (1967) — it appears that, on a wet roadway in a construction area marked by a dozen signs warning of danger, defendant’s vehicle (according to the trooper’s hearsay testimony) jackknifed, crossed into the opposite lane and struck another vehicle. There is no evidence that defendant was speeding or, indeed, that he drove “carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property.” N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. State v. Tuccillo, 76 218*218 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 1962), on which the State relies, is critically distinguishable; that case involved an appeal from the Director of Motor Vehicles’ revocation of defendant’s driver’s license, and was not a quasi-criminal proceeding. Cf. Cestone, above.
Res ipsa is properly invoked in negligence actions where the proofs disclose that the offending instrumentality was in defendant’s sole control, that the occurrence bespeaks negligence, and there is no indication of contributory negligence. In such circumstances there arises a permissible presumption of negligence from plaintiff’s proof, and defendant is required to come forward with an explanation that will refute the presumption and show that the accident did not occur by reason of his lack of care. The foundation of the rule is the policy of placing the onus of producing evidence on the party “possessed of superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the causative circumstances.” Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 605-606 (1958).
Employment of the res ipsa doctrine obviously places a burden squarely on a defendant to explain why he was not negligent. The doctrine has no place in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where the burden is totally on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated a penal (or quasi-penal) statute.
Eliminating any benefit the State may have had from the improper invocation of the res ipsa doctrine, we find that the evidence adduced by the State did not support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
103 Carnegie Center Drive
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Princeton, New Jersey 08540
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heyburn@heyburnlaw.com
Superior Court in Atlantic County Invalidates Alcotest Breath Test Results and Now Alcotest Results in Robbinsville and Hamilton May be Invalidated
In State v. Chun, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the reliability of the State’s Alcotest, which is used to measure a driver’s presumed blood alcohol level. While the test is discussed at length under the DWI/DUI section of this web site, it is important to understand that the validity of the test was upheld in connection with the use of the Ertco-Hart temperature probe. At some point, both Robbinsville and Hamilton Township Police Departments switched to the use of a different temperature probe, the Digital NIST Temperature Measuring System. Interestingly, the Robbinsville Police Department did not even disclose the use of the unapproved probe until it published its Alcotest records from December 2010 to present. In light of the Court’s ruling below, the validity of both Robbinsville and Hamilton Township’s Alcotest results are in serious question. If you have been charged with a DWI/DUI in any municipality, especially in eith Robbinsville or Hamilton, it is important that you call for a free consultation to discuss the possibility of having the Alcotest results suppressed.
Law Offices of Edward Harrington Heyburn, PC
103 Carnegie Center Drive
Suite 300
Princeton, NJ 08540
Tel. (609) 259-7600
Fax (609) 259-7303
heyburn@heyburnlaw.com
The Law Offices of Edward Harrington Heyburn, PC is a full service law firm focusing on Personal Injury, Workers Compensation, Municipal Court Matter, Driving Under the Influence/Driving While Intoxicated, Traffic Matters, Domestic Violence, Family Law as well as DYFS Removal Cases.
Press of Atlantic City reported:
MAYS LANDING – A Superior Court judge’s ruling could negate drunken-driving arrests throughout Atlantic County, say area defense attorneys and municipal prosecutors.In overturning a driving under the influence conviction this week, Judge Max Baker found that only one brand of thermometer probe should be used to determine the reliability of the breath-test machine.The decision – which covers the entire county – could throw out the results of any machine using another probe, lawyers say. State Police, who regulate the Alcotest breath test, could not immediately say how many police departments in Atlantic County use the component cited by the judge as unreliable. “Theoretically, the effect is huge,” said Michele Verno, a municipal prosecutor in four Atlantic County towns who said she had not yet read the ruling. “Because the temperature probe is the indicator of reliability for the machine, if that’s called into question, then so are the results.” “This is binding in every municipality in Atlantic County,” said Alan Lands, the Pleasantville attorney who argued the case. He said the case cannot be appealed because his client has now been acquitted, and to try him again would be double jeopardy.
Atlantic County Prosecutor Ted Housel said he could not comment on the case until he has read the ruling, but municipal prosecutors in the county will look to him in determining what happens next. “I’m sure Mr. Housel will evaluate the issue and give a directive on how to handle future prosecutions in these matters,” said Christopher Lipari, the Galloway Township prosecutor who got the conviction that Baker overturned this week. In that case, Emilio Rivera was pulled over Dec. 31, 2009, while driving on the Garden State Parkway. He was eventually administered the Alcotest at the Bass River Barracks, and his case heard in Galloway Township Municipal Court. But after his conviction, attorney Alan Lands appealed on several issues, including the probe manufacturer and that the room where the test was given had not been cleared of all other electronic equipment, as mandated so as not to interfere with the results.
When the state Supreme Court ruled the Alcotest could replace the Breathlyzer in police departments throughout the state, it named just one manufacturer for the thermometer probe, Baker noted. But instead of using the Ertco-Hart digital measuring system, some departments use one manufactured by the Control Company. Testimony in another trial concerning the two probes indicated Control is used because it’s much cheaper, costing about $300 compared with $2,000 for the Ertco-Hart that also requires annual recalibration for about $700. The Control probe is replaced rather than recalibrated. Baker found that the higher court mentioned Ertco-Hart several times in its ruling. “I don’t believe that the Supreme Court left out the words ‘or similar devices’ simply because they overlooked it,” he said. “I think they left it out for a particular reason.”
But even if the words had been included, Baker said the state did not prove that Control’s probe is comparable. While Ertco-Hart is independently tested, Control tests its own equipment. “If find that that is a critical error,” Baker said. Evan Levow, who argued the state Supreme Court case, said he was glad that Baker detailed why the Control Company’s probe should not be an alternative. “Not only do you have to meet these standards, it has to be verified independently,” he said. Levow said it’s likely another company’s probe will eventually be approved. Levow said that wouldn’t be a problem, as long as the same standards are applied. “It looks like Judge Baker was trying to follow the Supreme Court’s order,” said John Menzel, who also argued the Supreme Court case. Months of hearings on the Alcotest named only one probe, the Ertco-Hart, he said. “Ertco-Hart was not litigated all that much because it’s a fine piece of equipment,” Menzel said. “The use of the Control Company was never examined, and there was never any consideration of that device (in the case).” The State Police could not immediately comment on which municipalities have the Ertco-Hart and which have replaced that with the Control Company’s probe. Control did not return a request for comment. If the Alcotest results are lost, that does not automatically throw away any DUI cases in the county, Verno said. The prosecutor still would have the field-sobriety test and the officer’s testimony. “It doesn’t necessarily negate all previous and future cases,” she said. “But it does create some significant issues.”
Atlantic County isn’t the only one calling the probe into question. The appellate division heard arguments Tuesday on two Monmouth County cases in which the judge sided against Control. A judge in Mercer County found the probe was a reliable alternative.”Departments all over the state are going to be coming up on all sides of this issue until the appellate speaks,” said Menzel, who also represents one of the Monmouth County defendants. “There is no consensus on this issue statewide.”
New Jersey Supreme Court refuses to hold that a prior refusal constitutes a DWI for sentencing purposes!
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to resolve the conflict between the Appellate Division’s decisions in DiSomma and in this matter. 202 N.J. 43 (2010).
HELD: Defendant Ciancaglini’s conviction in 2006 for refusing to take a breathalyzer test does not constitute a prior conviction for purposes of determining her sentence for driving while intoxicated in 2008.
1. To interpret a statute, courts look to the Legislative intent, examining first the plain language of the statute. If the statute is clear on its face, courts enforce it; if it is ambiguous or open to more than one meaning, courts may consider extrinsic evidence, including legislative history and committee reports. Any reasonable doubt concerning the meaning of a penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. (Pp. 10-11)
2. Although N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4 are both part of a statutory complex designed to rid the highways of drunk drivers, each is a separate section with a different, albeit related, purpose, and each has different elements. Under the DWI statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated subjects the defendant to penalties that are based on the number of prior offenses the defendant has committed. For a first offense in which the driver’s blood alcohol content is .10% or higher, the sentence includes a license suspension of 2 seven months to one year, a fine, and a jail term of not more than 30 days. For a second violation, the sentence includes a two-year license suspension, a fine, and a jail term of up to ninety days. For a third or subsequent violation, the sentence includes a ten-year license suspension, a fine, and a jail term of 180 days. However, the DWI statute contains a “step-down” provision that states that “if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second conviction for sentencing purposes.” The refusal statute, N.J.S.A 39:4-50.4a, is similarly structured with penalties based on whether the conviction is the driver’s first, second, or third or subsequent offense. It requires the revocation of the right to operate a motor vehicle by any driver who, after being arrested for DWI, refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test. The length of license suspension for refusal mirrors the length of the license suspensions for DWI. However, no custodial sentence is authorized for refusal convictions. (Pp. 11-14)
3. Until the Appellate Division in this case reached the opposite conclusion, DiSomma represented the controlling case for sentencing DWI offenders with a prior refusal conviction. In DiSomma, the Appellate Division examined both the DWI statute and the refusal statute and determined that their provisions were intended to be separate.
Concluding that a prior refusal conviction cannot serve as the basis to enhance a subsequent DWI conviction, the defendant, who had a prior conviction for refusal, was sentenced as a first offender after his DWI conviction. Since DiSomma, there have been no legislative revisions to the DWI or refusal statutes suggesting an integration of refusal convictions into DWI sentencing. Although a 1997 amendment to both the DWI and refusal statutes was designed to ensure that DWI and refusal convictions in other jurisdictions qualify as prior offenses under the respective sections in New Jersey, the Legislature never endeavored to provide that a prior refusal conviction could be treated as a prior DWI. (Pp. 15-17)
4. The DWI statute contains no reference whatsoever to the refusal statute, and nothing suggests that the references to prior violations in the DWI statute’s lists of penalties are meant to refer to anything beyond DWI convictions. Without any statutory cross-reference, or similar expression, the most natural reading of the DWI statute suggests that the “prior” violations described in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 are meant to refer only to the DWI section in which they are contained. Such a reading is consistent with the well-established principle that penal statutes must be strictly construed. (Pp. 17-18)
5. While the record is not clear as to whether Ciancaglini’s 2006 refusal conviction was or was not incident to an acquittal of DWI, it cannot be reasonably suggested that someone convicted of refusal when found not guilty of DWI can be treated as if he or she were convicted of the DWI offense. If the Legislature wanted to treat a refusal conviction as an enhancer for SWI, even after an acquittal of DWI, it would have to do so in clearer language. (P.
18)
6. The Court determines that it need not decide in this case whether a person can twice take advantage of a stepdown under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 because Ciancaglini’s refusal conviction cannot be considered a prior DWI violation for enhancement purposes. As such, she is not precluded from the benefit of the step-down since her first DWI conviction in 1979 was more than ten years prior to her second, the 2008 DWI conviction. (Pp. 19-20)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the Law Division’s sentence is REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUDGE STERN’s opinion
Who says hiring the right lawyer doesn’t matter? Not Lawrence Taylor.
Troubled Giant’s great, Lawrence Taylor was facing charges of having sex with a child prostitute. The charges could have put him in jail for the better part of his natural life. Men of wealth, like Taylor don’t sit back and wait. They hire the best criminal attorneys that money can buy. Many people opt to let a court appointed an attorney to handle their fate. While the Public Defender’s office is filled with many good attorneys, they are overworked and stretched thin. Too thin to give you the type of representation that money can buy. Today was the best example of Allan Dershowitz’s adage, “A lot of money buys a lot of justice.” Lawrence Taylor’s attorney successfully negotiated a plea bargain that kept the Pro-Ball linebacker out of jail. Six years probation and no jail for Taylor.
While your legal circumstance may be different, you deserve a good attorney. While money is important, you cannot put a price on your freedom. If you have questions about a criminal case, please feel free to give me a call. After a free consultation, you can decide for yourself!
Law Offices of Edward Harrington Heyburn, PC
103 Carnegie Center Drive
Suite 300
Princeton, NJ 08540
Tel. (609) 259-7600
Fax (609) 259-7303
heyburn@heyburnlaw.com
The Law Offices of Edward Harrington Heyburn, PC is a full service law firm focusing on Personal Injury, Workers Compensation, Municipal Court Matter, Driving Under the Influence/Driving While Intoxicated, Traffic Matters, Domestic Violence, Family Law as well as DYFS Removal Cases.
We have moved!
Please note that we have moved to:
103 Carnegie Center Drive
Suite 300
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Tel. (609) 259-7600
Fax (609) 259-7303
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